I
n Canada, partial wage replacement is provided to new parents who take time away from a paid job to care for their infants through the "maternity and parental benefits" component of the Employment Insurance (previously Unemployment Insurance) program. Thus, until 1997, applicants for maternity/parental benefits required 20 weeks of paid employment with either 15 hours per week or minimum weekly earnings. The switch from Unemployment Insurance (UI) to Employment Insurance (EI), means that applicants now require 700 hours of paid employment -the equivalent of 20 weeks with 35 hours per week (with no minimum earnings restriction).
Under either program, some new parents who are in the labour force will not satisfy the conditions necessary to receive benefits. In general, it is easier to receive regular UI/EI benefits than to receive maternity benefits. 1 Policy history clearly indicates that this reflects a concern about potential program abuse by new mothers (i.e., some women might enter the labour force prior to having a child simply in order to gain access to benefits). When maternity benefits were first added to the UI program in 1971, the 20-week entrance requirement was imposed as well as a "magic-10" rule requiring a maternity benefits claimant to prove that she had been in paid work ten weeks prior to conception. The magic-10 rule was abolished in 1984, though the extra work requirement (compared to most regular benefits claimants) has been maintained. 2 But, should we be worried about such incentive effects when designing a maternity/parental benefits program? The behavioural implications of the Canadian maternity/parental benefits program are not well understood. 3 We do not know, for example, whether fertility decisions are influenced by this program, 4 or whether women modify their labour supply behaviour in order to establish eligibility. If behavioural responses to the program are large, then the present program design makes sense. If, on the other hand, behavioural responses are minimal, then it may be reasonable to change eligibility conditions so that it is at least as easy to qualify for maternity benefits as to qualify for UI/EI benefits (or perhaps even easier). It is important to remember that some people might genuinely be unable to obtain sufficient paid employment to ensure eligibility. This can be particularly troublesome for Canadians in their prime child-bearing years (i.e., aged less than 35 years), who typically face higher unemployment rates than older adults. Moreover, continued growth of non-standard employment (jobs with low weekly hours and/or short durations) could mean that fewer and fewer new parents will be able to satisfy the requirements necessary to receive benefits. 5 This paper focuses on two questions about potential behavioural responses to the Canadian maternity/parental benefits system: Do some women have babies in order to take advantage of the program? and Do some women increase hours of paid labour in order to gain access to benefits? Answers to these questions are important for sensible policy design.
To address the first question, a probit model of the probability that a woman will have a baby is estimated in which the key explanatory variable is a dummy variable which equals 1 if she was eligible for maternity benefits under UI, the program in place at the time the data used for the analysis were collected. Results suggest that fertility is not sensitive to the availability of maternity benefits. This does not seem unreasonable. It is perhaps more likely that a woman planning to have a baby might increase her labour supply prior to the birth in order to entitle herself to benefits. To examine this issue, a probit model of the probability of increasing labour supply enough (or more) than required to establish eligibility for maternity/parental benefits is estimated. Women who have just given birth or adopted a child 6 are not significantly more likely to have increased their labour supply in the year preceding the birth than other women, suggesting a lack of labour supply response to the Canadian maternity/ parental benefits system.
The final question addressed in the paper is whether the switch from UI to EI is likely to have affected eligibility for maternity/parental benefits. The change from UI to EI means that every hour of paid work "counts" toward benefit eligibility. This should improve access to benefits for some new parents with non-standard jobs, but the switch to an hours criterion means that workers with low weekly hours must have more weeks of work in order to be eligible. For example, a woman working 20 weeks with 15 hours per week (300 hours) would have been entitled to maternity benefits under the UI system; the same woman would require over twice as many hours to qualify for maternity benefits under the EI system. Thus, the net effect of the program change for access to maternity/parental benefits is not obvious, a priori.
This paper provides some initial estimates of the impact. Given the lack of estimated behavioural response to maternity benefits under the UI system reported in the first section of the paper, it is reasonable to assume that the change to EI will not have Maternity and Parental Benefits in Canada: Are there Behavioural Implications? 417 significantly modified the labour market behaviour of new mothers. Hence, changes in eligibility associated with the program change are simply calculated based on labour market history in the year prior to the birth/adoption of the child.
Throughout, the paper uses data from the 1988/ 89/90 Labour Market Activities Survey (LMAS) panel. Although this data set is now ten years old, for the purposes of this study it offers two key advantages: three years of data are available to enable us to study changes in labour market behaviour in the year prior to having a baby; and the sample size is large enough to give us a reasonable sample of new mothers. 7 Another caveat is that the paper focuses exclusively on women. Only women are eligible for maternity benefits, but both men and women are eligible for parental benefits (on the same terms). However, since only a small fraction of parental benefits claimants are men (e.g., never more than 6 percent in 1999 -CANSIM, D739873), this paper focuses on women. 8 
DATA
The 1988/89/90 Labour Market Activities Survey is a panel study of individual labour market experience in Canada. Respondents were drawn from the Labour Force Survey sampling frame and were interviewed in three consecutive years (during January/February) about their previous year's labour market experiences. In each year, respondents were asked about the start and finish dates of each job held in the previous year (up to five jobs), the wage and non-wage characteristics of each job, the reasons for any interruption in employment, average hours per day and days per week during each spell of employment. As well, basic demographic information was collected. (However, the LMAS contains extremely limited information about other family members.) Thus, this survey includes information about weeks of self-employment versus paid employment, hourly wage rates, and weekly hoursall of which are necessary to calculate potential eligibility for maternity/parental benefits. One major limitation of the LMAS from the perspective of this research is that it is not possible to determine which individuals actually collect maternity benefits.
While it is not possible to identify all new births with certainty using the LMAS, 9 a very good approximation can be made by locating all families with an increase in the total number of children present from one year to the next and at least one child in the 0-2 year age category; or an increase in the number of children in the 0-2 year age category with no change in the number of children in the family (in case an older child leaves home). An important advantage of the data set is that we can observe labour market behaviour for two years prior to the birth of the child, which then allows us to assess changes in behaviour immediately prior to the birth which may be a result of the maternity/ parental benefits program. Table 1 presents basic sample characteristics. In 1990, 1,080 women in the LMAS data set reported the birth/adoption of an infant (4 percent of all women aged 16 to 65). Thus, our weighted total number of women estimated to have given birth/ adopted in 1990 is 375,013 while CANSIM (label 0144; matrix 0004) reports 405,486 births for the same year, which does not seem unreasonable. (Our estimates do not include multiple births.) The vast majority of women who gave birth in 1990 were labour force participants in 1989 (884 women or 82 percent).
A significant majority of women with infants were in the 25 to 34 age range (61 percent). Women aged 20 to 24 were the second most likely to have a baby in 1990 (27 percent). The largest number of mothers with newborns have no other children (45 percent of all new mothers; 52 percent of labour force participants); the smallest number of mothers have 3 or more additional children (5 percent of all new mothers; 2 percent of labour force participants). 
BASIC DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Since the economics literature on this subject is very sparse, 10 this section of the paper provides a basic descriptive analysis of the characteristics of the population potentially eligible to receive maternity/ parental benefits in Canada in 1990. 11 Table 2 reports calculations of potential eligibility under the former UI system for all new mothers 12 as well as for those who were in the labour force. Since weeks of self-employment do not count toward benefit eligibility, the nature of employment was checked for each individual on a week-by-week basis. The estimates of eligibility for benefits emphasized throughout the paper are based on labour market behaviour in 1989.
In fact, eligibility for UI maternity/parental benefits should be based on employment history in the 12 months preceding the claim. Thus, for example, if a woman began her maternity leave on 1 December 1990, the eligibility period should be from 1 December 1989 to 1 December 1990 (and not from 1 January 1989 to 31 December 1989). To assess whether the results reported in this paper are affected by calculating eligibility based on 1989 work history, we also determined the week in 1990 during which a woman's leave began, and then calculated benefit eligibility based on the 52 weeks preceding the leave start-date. This was possible for 75 percent of the 884 women who had been in the labour force in 1989 and had babies in 1990 because these women actually reported time out of the labour force at some point in 1990. Calculated eligibility status was the same using either method for all but 32 women. Since qualitative results were not affected, we report only the results based on 1989 work history for everyone, noting any differences that seem interesting. 13 Table 1 indicates that 62.1 percent of all women who gave birth to (or adopted) a baby in 1990 could potentially have qualified for maternity/parental benefits based on 1989 employment history; 73.3 percent of women who had a baby in 1990 and who were in the labour force in 1989 could have qualified. 14 While the LMAS does not report specifically on receipt of maternity or parental benefits, we do know whether the individual reported receipt of UI (which could include regular or sickness benefits as well as maternity or parental benefits). Of the women we estimate to be potentially eligible for benefits based on 1989 work history, 71 percent reported receipt of UI (a very crude estimate of benefit take-up).
Potential eligibility follows a definite age pattern. Presumably because many are still in school, teenaged new mothers were least likely to be eligible (only 40 percent). New mothers aged 20 to 24 are most likely to be eligible (68 of all new mothers in this age category; 80 percent of those in the labour force in 1989). The drop in potential eligibility for older new mothers is probably due to restricted labour force participation associated with previous children.
New mothers with less than a high school diploma are much less likely to be eligible for maternity UI (only 40 percent of all new mothers are eligible; 61 percent of labour force participants) than are new mothers in any other educational group. Surprisingly, new mothers with a university-level education are relatively unlikely to qualify.
Women reporting that they experience difficulty in obtaining as many weeks of employment as desired are much less likely than other women to be eligible for UI benefits. Only 37.4 percent of all new mothers reporting themselves "constrained" in terms of weeks of work would be eligible; 31.5 percent of new mothers in the labour force reporting themselves "constrained" would be able to satisfy all conditions for UI eligibility. This contrasts with 64.6 percent of "non-constrained" new mothers (78.2 percent of "non-constrained" new mothers in the labour force) who would be eligible.
For new mothers with any labour force attachment in 1989, some of the largest differences in potential eligibility for benefits exist across occupation and industry groups. For example, 84 percent of new mothers with clerical occupations and 81 percent of new mothers with professional occupations are eligible for maternity UI while only 36 percent of new mothers with farming or fishing occupations are eligible. (No new mothers with the occupation of full-time homemaker would be eligible for maternity benefits in Canada.)
For women with some labour force attachment in 1989, there are also important differences across industry of employment in the proportion of the sample eligible for maternity/parental benefits. For example, 94 percent of women employed in utilities were eligible; only 45 percent of women employed in primary industries were eligible.
Certain characteristics of the family also appear to have important links with potential eligibility for maternity/parental benefits. First, new mothers who are not married are less likely than those who are married or living with a partner to be eligible for maternity/parental benefits. Second, number of children present in the family in addition to the newborn is extremely important. Seventy-eight percent of first-time new mothers are eligible for benefits; 58 percent of new mothers with one other child are eligible; 43 percent of new mothers with two other children are eligible; only 11 percent of new mothers with three or more other children are eligible. Finally, Figure 1 illustrates a clear relationship between hourly wage rate in 1989 and potential eligibility for maternity/parental benefits in 1990. Women with low hourly wages are very unlikely to be eligible while women with higher hourly wages are much more likely to be eligible.
BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSES TO MATERNITY/ PARENTAL BENEFITS

Fertility Responses?
Neoclassical economic theory, following Becker (1981) , argues that a reduction in the opportunity cost of having children, through, for example, the provision of maternity benefits, should increase childbearing. In the Canadian context, two studies of this issue using aggregate time series data reach different conclusions. Hyatt and Milne (1991) find that the introduction of maternity benefits in 1971 did increase the total fertility rate in Canada, though fertility was inelastic with respect to benefit levels. In contrast, Zhang, Quan and Van Meerbergen (1994) find no evidence of such an effect. 15 Since possible fertility responses are central to an understanding of the economic consequences of the maternity/parental benefits program, we re-visit this issue using the LMAS micro data. The question addressed at this stage is: Is a woman more likely to have a baby if she will receive maternity benefits? Table 2 presents probit estimates of the 
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EI UI probability of having a baby in 1990, using the full LMAS sample of women aged 16 to 64 (26,646 observations). 16 The key explanatory variable is a dummy which indicates that the woman is potentially eligible for maternity benefits under the former UI system (which was in place at the time the data were collected). However, we also examine the effect of the replacement rate (while the specified replacement rate was 55 percent in 1990, a ceiling on benefits means that higher-income women effectively receive a lower rate). If incentive effects exist, they should be smaller for women receiving lower replacement rates.
Two specifications of the fertility equation are reported in Table 2 . In the first, we include weeks worked in 1989 (including self-employment weeks or weeks with low hours or earnings, which do not count toward benefit eligibility), and wage rate in 1989. 17 While these variables are used in the calculation of eligibility status, they might also be expected to exert an independent influence on fertility. However, given the strong correlation between weeks and wages and eligibility for benefits, we also report a specification that excludes these variables. Other controls include average hours worked per week in 1989, age, number and age of other children, marital status, and other family income.
The key point to take from Table 2 is that neither the "eligible for benefits" dummy variable nor the replacement rate are significant in either specification. Additional weeks of work in 1989 are associated with lower fertility; a higher hourly wage rate in 1989 is associated with higher fertility. 18 Thus, women who worked more weeks in 1989 are less likely to have babies in 1990; women with higher hourly wages in 1989 are more likely to have babies in 1990, but there is no statistically significant difference in estimated fertility between two women with the same weeks and/or hourly wage, one of whom is eligible for benefits and one of whom is not (e.g., because one is self-employed or because one works many weeks at low hours/wages). Thus, the micro data results support the conclusions of Zhang, Quan and Van Meerbergen (1994) : the availability of maternity benefits does not appear to increase the probability of having a baby.
This does not seem an unreasonable finding. The decision to have a child (to the extent that this is rationally planned) is a major one. While a woman who claims the full 25 weeks of benefits will receive a substantial amount of money (e.g., $4,592 for a woman with the average weekly earnings for women with babies in 1990), 19 this is still small compared with the overall cost of the child, to say nothing of non-pecuniary costs such as sleepless nights, diaper changes, etc.
Perhaps more reasonable is the finding of a Swedish author (Hoem 1990) , that the structure of a maternity benefits program is likely to influence the timing of births for individuals already planning to have children. This is essentially the question addressed in the next section: Might a woman planning to have a baby in 1990 adjust her labour supply behaviour in 1989 in order to ensure entitlement to maternity/parental benefits?
Labour Supply Responses?
Little is currently known about possible laboursupply effects of the Canadian maternity/parental benefits program. This section asks whether women might adjust their labour supply behaviour in order to gain eligibility for benefits if they are planning to have a baby (assuming having a baby is entirely a planned event)? Under the former UI system, for example, might a woman who had previously worked only ten hours per week in the paid labour market, try to increase labour supply in the year before the anticipated birth of a child to the necessary 15 hours per week (or to the necessary 20 weeks per year, or both)?
To explore this issue, we first examined the frequencies of paid weeks worked per year and paid hours worked per week for all women, and for women with babies in 1990. Since the data reflect a period during which the UI system was in place, one 
might expect to see spikes at 15 hours per week and 20 weeks per year for new mothers if significant strategic use of the maternity benefits program had gone on. Neither is apparent (see Figures 2a and 2b) .
In any case, working any particular combination of hours and weeks is not necessarily an indication of strategic behaviour designed to take advantage of the maternity/parental benefits system. A woman who had, for some reason, chosen to work 15 hours per week and 20 weeks per year and who had done so for ten years prior to the birth of her child can hardly be accused of strategic behaviour if she then claims benefits. The label of strategic behaviour might more appropriately be given to someone who increased labour supply in the year prior to the birth of a child in such a way as to satisfy the 15-hour and 20-week conditions. Of course, even this might be explained by other factors, such as finishing an education or getting divorced.
We again use the LMAS micro data to look for evidence that women who were planning to have babies in 1990 adjusted their labour supply behaviour between 1988 and 1989 by estimating a probit equation with dependent variable equal to 1 if a woman either increased hours per week to some number greater than or equal to 15 and/or increased weeks per year from less than 20 to 20 or more between 1988 and 1989 so that she would have been ineligible for benefits according to 1988 labour supply but eligible according to 1989 labour supply. These changes can be from zero weeks/hours to over 20/15, respectively, or from any small positive number of paid weeks/hours. The estimating sample includes all women aged less than 65.
How common are changes of this sort? While 7.4 percent of all women (9.1 percent of women who had babies in 1990) worked less than 20 weeks in 1988, but more than 20 weeks in 1989 and 7.2 percent of all women (5.8 percent of women who had babies in 1990) worked less than 15 hours in 1988 but more in 1989, only 2.1 percent of all women (2.3 percent of women who had babies in 1990) increased both hours and weeks. That is, only 2.3 percent of women who had babies in 1990 would not have been eligible for benefits based on 1988 behaviour but were eligible based on 1989 behaviour. No obvious pattern of women who are planning to have babies modifying their behaviour to a greater degree than other women is immediately obvious. The key explanatory variable included in the probit equation for increasing labour supply to "become eligible" for maternity/parental benefits is a dummy variable indicating that the woman actually had a baby in 1990: our proxy for having planned to have a baby. It is, of course, bizarre to suppose that all pregnancies are rationally planned well in advance. Many "accidents" happen. Moreover, many couples planning to have children are unable to do so, certainly at a very particular time. But, if we are to investigate the possibility that some individuals who are planning to have babies adjust their behaviour so as to take advantage of the maternity/parental benefits system, then we have to assume a fair capacity to plan for pregnancy.
Of course, other factors than a hoped-for pregnancy may lead to increases in labour supply between one year and the next. Thus, we include as explanatory variables indicators of change in educational status: (i) dropped out indicates that the individual attended school full-time in 1988, but not in 1989 with no change in educational credentials; (ii) graduated indicates that the individual attended school full-time in 1988, but not in 1989 and increased educational credentials (e.g., moved from some postsecondary to university degree); (iii) correspondence/part-time indicates that the individual did not attend school full-time in either year, but nevertheless increased educational credentials. (The base category is for those with no change in schooling, either because they were not at school in either year or because they were at school in both years, with no change in credentials.)
We also include two indicators of change in marital status: became married between 1988 and 1989 and became divorced between 1988 and 1989, since either change in marital status may lead to changes in labour supply behaviour. Interprovincial migration may also be associated with increased labour supply if, for example, the woman had moved to take up a job. Finally, changes in perceived labour market constraints, reflecting changes in local labour demand conditions may be associated with increased labour supply from year to year.
Results of the probit analysis are presented in the Appendix, Table A2 . The first set of regressions straightforwardly include the dummy variable indicating that the woman had a baby in 1990. However, it is clear from the probit results reported in Table  A2 that fertility behaviour depends upon labour supply. In an effort to deal with this endogeneity, the change in labour supply equation was also estimated replacing the actual zero/one 1990 fertility dummy variable with the predicted probability of having a baby as calculated using a first-stage fertility equation available on request from the author. 20 The effects of control variables are unremarkable (increases in labour supply are associated with increases in education, divorce, and, especially, removal of labour market constraints). 21 Becoming married, or moving interprovincially are not statistically significant. A dummy variable indicating that the woman had a baby in 1990 is statistically insignificant whether entered directly or through an instrumental variables procedure. Thus, it appears that women planning to have a baby in 1990 did not increase labour supply between 1988 and 1989 in order to take advantage of the maternity/parental benefits program. Given the very high rates of labour force participation by young women, and even by mothers with young children, this result presumably reflects the fact that there are not that many young women outside the labour force who would be able to enter in order to take advantage of the maternity benefits program. 22 Figure 3 illustrates the difference between UI and EI in terms of eligibility conditions for maternity/ parental benefits. Under UI, claimants required 20 weeks of work and 15 hours per week. 23 Thus, in Figure 3 , anyone located in the upper-right quadrant of the diagram would be eligible for benefits. Under EI, claimants require 700 hours of employment. The 700-hour rectangular hyperbola is noted in the diagram; anyone located to the right of this curve is eligible for maternity/parental benefits under the EI system. Assuming no change in laboursupply behaviour, claimants whose entitlement status would change as a result of the switch from UI to EI are those located in any of the shaded areas. First, workers with fewer than 15 hours per week, but with enough weeks to have accumulated 700 hours would qualify under EI but not under UI (see the shaded area on the right of the diagram above the rectangular hyperbola but beneath the horizontal line). 24 Note, however, that a woman working 14 hours per week would require 50 weeks of paid employment to establish entitlement. A second group of workers will also benefit from the switch from UI to EI: those with less than 20 weeks of eligible employment but sufficient hours per week to total 700 (see the shaded area on the left side of the diagram above the rectangular hyperbola but to the left of the vertical line). For example, a woman working only 18 weeks, but 40 hours per week would be eligible for maternity/parental benefits under EI but not under UI. On the other hand, disentitlement will occur for women working at least 20 weeks with at least 15 hours per week but without the 700 hours required for EI (see the shaded area underneath the rectangular hyperbola but above both the 15 hour and 20 week lines). For example, a new mother with exactly 15 hours and 20 weeks of employment will have substantially less (300 hours) than the 700 minimum hours required for benefits under the EI system.
CHANGES IN POTENTIAL ACCESS TO BENEFITS RESULTING FROM EI
Given the results of the previous section, it seems unlikely that any major changes in either fertility or labour supply would have followed the program change. Thus, Table 3 once again uses the 1989/90 LMAS data simply to calculate, based on 1989 employment history, whether women who had babies in 1990 would have been eligible for maternity/ parental benefits under the UI system and under the EI system. It is important again to note that we are not using data which span the actual time of the policy implementation. Rather, given the econometric evidence that it is unlikely that major behavioural adjustments will have occurred as a result of the change in the maternity/parental benefits program, this exercise asks how women living with the labour market conditions of 1990 would have been affected had they been faced with an EI rather than a UI system. 25 Results suggest relatively little difference (1.6 percentage points) in potential eligibility for maternity/ parental, for new mothers in the labour force in the year prior to the birth of their child. In terms of Figure  3 , 1.8 percent of women became entitled to benefits because while they did not have 20 weeks of employment, they worked enough hours per week to reach 700 (i.e., they were located in the left-most lightly shaded area). Only 0.6 percent of the sample gained eligibility because they had many weeks, but less than 15 hours per week. On the other hand, 4 percent lost entitlement as a result of the switch from UI to EI (were located in the darker shaded area of Figure 1) . Therefore, it is unlikely that the switch from UI to EI has resulted in major changes in overall access to maternity/parental benefits. There are, however, some interesting variations in the consequences of the program change for women in particular circumstances. For example, while the program change has almost no effect on new mothers aged 25 to 34, fewer younger (less than 25) and older women (more than 35) will have access to maternity/parental benefits (reductions of 3.4 and 4.2 percentage points respectively). Women reporting themselves constrained in terms of weeks of employment in 1989 are more likely (2.6 percentage points) to receive EI than UI. There is an eight-percentage point reduction in potential eligibility for new mothers with three or more other children; a four-percentage point reduction for those with two other children.
To better sort out these findings, Table 4 presents the results of probit analyses of the probability of qualifying for maternity/parental benefits under the two policy regimes. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the woman would have qualified for UI maternity/parental benefits in 1990, based on 1989 employment history; in column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the woman would have qualified for EI maternity/parental benefits based on 1989 employment history. The sample for analysis is all women who gave birth to (or adopted) a baby in 1990 and who had some labour force experience in 1989.
A comparison of the probit equation for UI eligibility with the probit equation for EI eligibility suggests an overall similarity in the characteristics associated with a higher (or lower) probability of being eligible for benefits, with a few notable differences. In both cases, teenaged new mothers are much less likely to be eligible for benefits. New mothers without a high school education are less likely than those with a high school education to be eligible for maternity benefits, though this effect is larger under the EI system. Rather unexpectedly, new mothers with university-level education are also less likely to be eligible than new mothers with a high school diploma. Perhaps women with a university degree have had less opportunity to work in the paid labour force before having children? With either program, being unable to obtain as many weeks of paid employment as desired has a large negative association with being eligible for benefits. And, having any other children is negatively related to the probability of being eligible for benefits; additional other children increase the magnitude of this effect. In general, women who are least well-off are also least likely to be eligible for maternity/parental benefits. 26 
CONCLUSIONS
In Canada, maternity and parental benefits are provided through the Employment Insurance program (previously Unemployment Insurance), though eligibility conditions are generally tougher for maternity or parental benefits than for regular EI. This feature of the program design reflects an historical interest in minimizing incentives for women to enter the labour force only for the purpose of gaining access to benefits. Yet, do we need to worry about such strategic behaviour? Very little is known about the behavioural implications of the Canadian maternity/parental benefits system. If, in fact, behavioural effects are minimal, then it might be a reasonable policy option to make it at least as easy to qualify for maternity/parental benefits as to qualify for regular EI benefits, particularly in view of the relatively bad economic conditions currently faced by Canadian adults aged less than 35, who are most likely to have babies. This paper uses micro data from the 1988/89/90 Labour Market Activities Survey to study some behavioural implications of the maternity/parental benefits system. We find, first, that fertility behaviour is not significantly influenced by the availability of maternity/parental benefits and, second, that there is no evidence that women adjusted their labour supply behaviour in order to gain access to benefits under the former UI system (which was in operation at the time the data used for the analysis were collected).
We also examine who is potentially eligible for maternity/parental benefits and find that teenaged new mothers and those with little education are much less likely to have access to benefits. Women who are experiencing difficulty in the labour market in the sense of being unable to obtain as many weeks of paid employment as desired are less likely to be eligible for benefits. Women with other children are less likely to be eligible; this effect becomes larger as the number of other children increases. These basic conclusions are true for the former UI system as well as for the EI system. (There appears to be 7 Alternative data sources would be the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) and the COEP. Although these data sets are newer, public-use versions do not have enough information for the purposes of our analysis. The COEP, moreover, does not include any new mothers who have not recently been in the labour market which would preclude the fertility analysis conducted here. We do not yet have public access to enough years of SLID data to conduct this analysis.
8 Phipps (1994) reports that men were more likely than women to be eligible for parental benefits, though very few actually take these benefits. 9 For example, it is not possible to distinguish the case of a woman marrying and giving birth within two years and the case of a woman marrying a man with a 0-2 yearold child. We considered eliminating "unlikely" births, but decided that this introduced too much researcher bias. 10 Routhier and Labowka (1994) is an HRDC evaluation document that provides a careful history and raises many policy questions. Moloney (1989a and 1989b) provides some descriptive evidence about maternity absences using the Absence from Work Survey. Pal (1985) argues, from an historical and analytical perspective, that maternity benefits should not be included as part of the UI program since UI is governed by issues of labour force attachment while maternity benefits are to aid families around the time of the birth of a child. fewer individuals enter the labour force. If we simply exclude these individuals from the denominator, we will over-estimate true access to maternity/parental benefits in the region. Moreover, it is important to remember that in some countries, maternity/parental benefits are available to all new parents: not just those with sufficient labour market attachment. 13 Since only the labour market data are available on a weekly basis, this choice seemed the cleanest for two reasons: First, we can then follow the same procedure for all women. Second, we can discuss the same time period for all variables.
14 It may well be the case that women who are eligible for maternity/parental benefits are more likely to take time out of the labour market. For new mothers who had been in the labour force in 1989, potential eligibility is higher for those who took time out than for those who did not (79.4 percent versus 66.3 percent). 15 Hyatt and Milne use a variable constructed as a weighted average of average female wages and average maternity benefits, post-1970. Zhang, Quan and Van Meerbergen experiment with dummy variables for introduction/liberalization of the program. 16 The estimating sample includes all women aged less than 65 since there was a small number of women in the 45-64 age ranges reporting the addition of an infant to the household. While giving birth is less likely for the older women, adoption is a possibility that would entitle the new mother to benefits. These equations were also run using a sample of women aged less than 45, and results were essentially unchanged. 17 Since not all women in the sample are observed with positive wages, a predicted wage rate for 1989 is used. The wage equation is estimated using the sample of all women in the LMAS with positive wages in 1989, correcting for sample selectivity bias in the usual way through the inclusion of an inverse mill's ratio from a first-stage, labour force participation probit analysis. Explanatory variables in the wage equation include: dummies for age, region, education, occupation, and industry as well as number of other children. The first-stage probit for labour force participation in 1989 includes weeks worked in 1988, disability status in 1989, minority status and marital status as well as the age and education dummies. These results are available upon request from the author. 18 If we take out all of the labour market variables, the UI eligibility dummy becomes statistically significant, but negative: presumably because weeks of work is statistically significant and negative and UI eligibility depends very much on past weeks of work.
19 This is calculated as 55 percent of $334 for 25 weeks. 20 Instruments include woman's age, number and age of other children, minority status, language, and disability status. 21 Labour supply is also predicted to increase when a labour market constraint has appeared rather than disappeared. This seemingly counter-intuitive result in fact makes sense because it means that the individual is now looking for more work (and may previously not have wanted paid employment at all). Thus, for example, 19 percent of women who were underemployed in 1989, but not in 1988, had more weeks of paid employment in 1989. 22 In 1989, 94.5 percent of women aged 16 to 64 without children were in the labour force; 75.9 percent of women aged 16 to 64 with children were in the labour force. 23 It is assumed that the wage rate is exogenous in the relatively short run, so no attention is paid to the possibility of an individual attempting to achieve a higher wage rate in order to satisfy the minimum earnings condition of UI. 24 Unless they had very high earnings. 25 Unemployment for women was lower in 1999 than in 1990 (7.3 versus 8.1 percent -CANSIM D980759). Female labour force participation was very similar (58.9 in 1999 versus 58.5 in 1990 -CANSIM D980792). 26 Of course, this does not necessarily mean that they do have access to any cash transfers. For example, 16.2 percent of all women we estimate to be ineligible for maternity benefits report receipt of social assistance benefits. Notes: (Asymptatic) standard errors are in parentheses. 1. The dependent variable is a dummy=1 if either hours of paid work increased from less than 15 to more than 15 and/or weeks per year increased from less than 20 to more than 20 between 1988 and 1989 so that a woman previously not eligible for maternity/parental benefits would become eligible. *Indicates the variable is significant at the 90 percent confidence level. **Indicates the variable is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. ***Indicates the variable is significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
APPENDIX
